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CHAPTER I. 
INTRODUCTION
Taiwan was originally one of the provinces of the Republic of China (ROC). 
After the Civil War between the ROC and the Chinese Communists in 1949, the ROC 
government moved to Taiwan, China was separated into two countries — the Republic 
of China and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). After 1949 the two countries had 
no trading relationship nor other forms of contact, because it violated ROC’s Martial Law. 
Since 1987, trading and investment activities between Taiwan and China have rapidly 
increased, and Taiwanese investments are increasing at a faster rate than those of other 
countries.
Taiwan now ranks as the world’s twelfth largest trading nation. In 1989, the 
estimated value of Taiwan’s foreign trade was US$120 billion, and its per capita Gross 
National Product (GNP) was about US$8,000,* 25th in the world.^ In 1990, Taiwan’s 
foreign-exchange reserves were nearly US$75 billion.^
As a small island, Taiwan is limited in most of the natural resources needed to 
produce manufactured goods. Its industries depend on import for raw materials and 
natural resources. China is the largest raw material and herbal medicine exporter for 
Taiwan’s industries.
Indirect trade through Hong Kong or other third party countries is the only means 
of trade between Taiwan and China. In 1988, Hong Kong ranked as Taiwan’s third 
export and fourth import trading partner, (see Table 1) Indirect bilateral trade between
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Taiwan and China in 1988 reached US$3.4 billion, 42.5 times more than in 1979.* It 
represented almost half of the total trade between Taiwan and Hong Kong that year.
Table 1
TAIW AN’S FIVE LEADING TRADING PARTNERS (1988)
(Unit; US$ million)
Exports to Amount Im ports from Amount
U.S.A. 23,432.0 Japan 14,824.2
Japan 8,762.1 U.S.A. 13,002.0
Hong Kong 5,579.7 West Germany 2,132.1 
West Germany 2,338.1 Hong Kong 1,921.7
United Kingdom 1,904.9 Australia 1,336.2
Source; Republic of China Yearbook. (Taipei, Taiwan, Kwang Hwa Co., 1989); 716.
In the 1980’s, the internal economic environment of Taiwan expanded 
tremendously and rapid export expansion gave rise to a change in the entire society. The 
savings rate has exceeded that of investment in the domestic market since 1981 (e.g. in 
1987, the saving rate was 39.3 percent and the investment rate was 19.6 percent).* The 
fact that there was an abundance of capital and a shortage of investment areas not only 
caused Taiwan’s housing, land and stock prices to skyrocket, but also resulted in 
continued appreciation of the New Taiwan dollar (NT$). In 1985, US$1 converted to 
almost NT$40; in August, 1991 the exchange rate was NT$26.82 to US$1. (see Table 2) 
A combination of the rapidly expanding economy, and the wide availability of higher- 
paying jobs (in 1989, the unemployment rate in Taiwan was 1.37 percent),* reduced the 
number of Taiwanese willing to work in manual labor jobs. This caused a tighter labor
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
market, increasing wage rates, and rising production costs in Taiwan.
Table 2
EXCHANGE RATES, NEW  TAIWAN DOLLAR CONVERTED TO U.S. DOLLAR
(Unit: Per US$)
Taiwan: NT Dollar
Mo/Dv/Y r Buying Rates Selling Rates
12/31/81 37.95 38.05
12/31/82 39.86 39.96
12/31/83 40.22 40.32
12/31/84 39.42 39.52
12/31/85 39.80 39.90
12/31/86 35.45 35.55
12/31/87 28.50 28.60
12/31/88 28.12 28.22
12/31/89 26.12 26.22
12/31/90 27.10 27.20
08/02/91 26.82 26.92
Sources: R.O.C., Executive Yuan, Council for Economic Planning & Development, 
Taiwan Statistical D ata Book. June 1988; 199; R.O.C., Executive Yuan, Council for 
Economic Planning & Development. Industry  of Free China, March 1989;198-199; The 
Asian Wall Street Journal. January 7, 1991;14; The Asian Wall Street Journal. 
August 5. 1991 ;26
Rapid industry expansion also caused Taiwan to become an expensive place for 
industry. The internal industrial structure has transformed from labor-intensive to 
capital-intensive and technology-intensive. Taiwanese entrepreneurs, especially in labor- 
intensive enterprises, have started to look outside Taiwan to establish their businesses, 
(see Table 3)
Taiwanese investment in China can be traced back to 1982. At that time, there 
were only a few Taiwanese investors setting up enterprises in China. Due to the change
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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in the economic structure and investment environment in Taiwan, businesses have been 
actively investing in China since 1986. In 1988, the year after the Taiwanese government 
lifted its ban on Taiwanese citizens visiting China, there were more than 200 Taiwanese 
investment projects in China. Before 1988, there were 430 Taiwanese projects totalling 
US$600 million in China.^
Table 3
TAIW AN’S OVERSEAS INVESTM ENT
1986 1987 1988 1989
No. of Value No. of Value No. of Value No. of Value 
Cases (US$m) Cases (US$m) Cases (US$m) Cases (USSml
Thailand 3 5.8 102 300 308 842 214 871
Malaysia none none 37 90 111 307 187 785
Indonesia n.a. 1.8 3 1 19 500 46 150
Philippines 1 0.07 18 9 45 109 21 149
Hong Kong 1 0.26 3 1 9 8 5 10
China n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 n.a. 600 n.a. 600
U.S. 16 46.00 21 70 42 123 55 509
Europe 1 0.2 3 10 16 17 13 73
Rest of World 20 2.8 6 6 13 18 18 62
Source: R.O.C., Industrial Development and Investment Center and Chung Hwa Institute 
for Economic Research.
Presently, the Taiwanese government only allows its people to invest in China 
through companies in third party countries. There were still 1,117 Taiwanese investors 
who obtained approval from Mainland China in 1990, for a total investment of US$984 
million. This ranked Taiwan as the second largest investor in China, next to Hong Kong. 
The Taiwanese concentrate their investments in the Special Economic Zones (SEZs), in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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which the PRC government grants special privileges to attract foreign capital (Le., 
banking services, taxes preferential, land, and housing ownership and using rights). Also 
popular are the opened coastal cities, which the PRC government wants to use as 
development models to develop inner parts of China.®
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the investment environment and the current 
investment activities of Taiwanese investors in three SEZs — Shenzhen, Shantou, and 
Xiamen — and in two opened coastal cities of China — Shanghai and Dalian. This study 
will discuss current investment activities and the industries that are more suitable for 
Taiwanese investors. The paper will then continue with discussion of the obstacles (i.e., 
the quality of labor forces, currency problems, the legal system, and other internal factors) 
that affect foreign investors.
Throughout the paper, the terms Mainland China, China and PRC will be used 
interchangeably. Taiwan or ROC will be used for the island also known as Formosa.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
C H A PTER  n .
PERSPECTIVES O N  R EPU B LIC  O F  CH IN A
A N D
PEO PLE’S REPU BLIC O F  CH IN A  E C O N O M IC  RELA TIO N S
In May 1981, China revoked the rule of Tariff Privilege which Taiwanese could 
obtain special tariff treatm ent exporting goods to  China from Taiwan. This caused 
a reduction of Taiwanese indirect exports to China.^ (see Table 4) China started  to 
establish Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to attract foreign investment, but the 
relationship between Taiwan and China was still retained.
Non-Interference in One-W ay Indirect T rade, 1985-1987
Since 1984, the trend has been toward large foreign investments into China. 
Foreign investment was encouraged not only in SEZs, but also in 14 coastal cities and 
th ree deltas, the areas which account for most of the industrial and commercial 
business in the national economy, (see Table 5) In 1986, China prom ulgated 
Provisional Regulations on Foreign Ventures, which allowed foreign investors to 
wholly own their enterprises in these open-door areas. T he Provisions for the 
Encouragem ent of Foreign Investment were also issued. T he central governm ent 
went a step further; it not only relinquished much of its control over trading business 
to  local governments or individual enterprises themselves, but also relaxed its control 
over foreign currency. These measures opened the door m uch wider to  foreign 
investors.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Table 4
RE-EXPORTS OF TAIW AN GOODS TO CHINA THROUGH HONG KONG
HK*s Re-exports Growth rate of Growth ra te  of
to  China Taiwan’s total PR C ’s total
Y ear Value G row th export value im port value
qjS$l,0(KD ratef% ) (%)_____________
1978 51 — 35.54 51.0
1979 21,291 41,747.05 26.93 43.9
1980 242,244 1,137.80 23.00 24.7
1981 390,186 61.07 14.10 -0.3
1982 208,159 -46.65 -1.80 -10.3
1983 168,643 -18.98 13.10 6.0
1984 425,618 152.38 21.20 36.8
1985 987,977 132.13 0.90 35.4
1986 811,024 -17.91 29.70 -3.6
1987 1,226,839 51.27 34.50 1.0
1988 2,242,200 82.76 13.00 27.9
1989 2,896,487 29.18 9.30 7.0
Sources; R.O.C., Chung-kuo t’ung-chi nien-chien 1989 (Statistical yearbook of China 
1989) (Chung-kuo t ’ung-chi ch’u-pan-she, 1989), 633; Lien-ho pao (United Daily News) 
(Taipei), February 16, 1990;6
During this time, the Taiwanese government still maintained its position that 
bilateral trade between China and Taiwan was illegal. It was not until July, 1985, that 
the Taiwanese government, under pressure from both international trends and domestic 
public opinion, announced that it would stand by the principle of "non-interference" and 
"non-encouragement" in dealing with exports of Taiwanese goods to Mainland China 
through third party countries. The main products that Taiwan shipped to Mainland China 
at that time were raw chemical fibers, textiles, building materials, machinery and 
electrical appliances.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 5
GROW TH O F DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA (1979 1988)
(bv num ber of contracts) 
Contracts Cumulative
Y ear signed total
1980 83 83
1981 320 403
1982 519 922
1983 470 1,392
1984 1,856 3,248
1985 3,073 6,321
1986 1,498 7,819
1987 2,233 10,052
1988 5,890 15,942
(by capital am ount, US$ billions)
Amount nledeed Amount utilized
Y ear Yearlv Cum ulative Yearlv Cum ulative
1979-1982 N.A. 6.01 N.A. 1.17
1983 1.73 7.74 0.64 1.80
1984 2.65 10.39 1.26 3.06
1985 5.93 16.32 1.66 4.72
1986 2.83 19.15 1.87 6.59
1987 3.71 22.86 2.31 8.90
1988 5.20 28.06 2.40 11.30
Source: R.O.C., Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade.
In return. Mainland China supplied Taiwan with herbal medicines, minerals, and 
special local products — animal by-products and raw materials for the chemical industry. 
Indirect trade surged and in 1985 the total amount exceeded US$1.1 billion.‘°
In the mid-1980’s, another important dimension of Taiwan-Mainland economic 
relations emerged: some Taiwanese investors, who were sanguine about the market 
potential and irreversibility of the Mainland’s ongoing economic reform, started searching
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
for direct investment opportunities on China’s southeast coast.”
1987 to  M id-1989
Although the total amount of Taiwanese investment in Southeast Asia surpassed 
that in China, the value and the number of Taiwanese investments in China increased year 
by year, (see Table 3) Investors were lured by lower wage rates (the average monthly 
wage rate was US$60 in China, compared to US$6(X) in Taiwan), rental of land or 
factories, a huge pool of labor, ample raw materials and convenience in using the same 
language, all of which could reduce the trading cost between Taiwan and China.”
China was now eager to obtain high-tech knowledge, management and marketing 
skills and as much foreign capital as possible, Taiwanese investors were welcomed in 
China not only for political reasons, such as a desire for reunification, but also for the 
reasons stated above.
With the new Provisions for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment, Taiwanese 
investors accelerated their investment in the southeast coast o f China in 1986. In 1987, 
the Taiwanese government announced that restrictions on indirect imports of twenty-seven 
agricultural and industrial raw materials from the PRC (China) were terminated. Taiwan 
residents were also permitted to visit their relatives in the PRC starting in November, 
1987. In August, 1988, the Taiwanese government legalized the indirect import of 
another fifty categories o f PRC agricultural and industrial raw materials (e.g. coal, steel, 
raw cotton, and others).
In April, 1988, China passed the Law of Foreign Cooperative Enterprise to 
encourage foreign investors to invest in China by means of technical co-operation, joint
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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ventures, and wholly foreign-owned enterprises. In July of 1988, China announced the 
National Regulations On Encouraging Taiwan Compatriots’ Investment. This legislation 
allowed Taiwanese citizens to invest in the same types of enterprises and to enjoy the 
same tax breaks as other foreign investors. Taiwanese investors were also given special 
privileges not available to other foreign investors, such as the right to buy and sell real 
estate, enterprise stocks and bonds.^^
As a result of these incentives, indirect trade and Taiwanese investment in China 
reached its highest levels to date. The total amount of indirect bilateral trade in 1988 
increased to US$2.72 billion, compared to US$1.56 billion in 1987. In 1988, Taiwanese 
investment in the PRC amounted to US$600 million, while the total accumulated amount 
of Taiwanese investment during the years 1979-1987 amounted to only US$100 
million.''* During 1979-1987, the goods that China imported from Taiwan were mostly 
cloth, electronics, chemical fiber, machinery, transportation equipment and raw materials 
for chemical industries. In return, China exported an abundant supply of coal, petroleum, 
cotton, minerals (uranium, tungsten, tin, antimony, and mercury), traditional Chinese 
medicinal herbs and animal and plant products.'^ Most of Taiwan’s investments were 
still focused on labor-intensive industries and infrastructure businesses, including textiles, 
toys, sporting shoes and umbrellas in the SEZs and southeast coastal areas. 
Post-Tiananm en
After the popular uprising which culminated in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 
1989, China took actions designed to control foreign investment and solve its internal 
economic problems (e.g., shortage of foreign currency and serious domestic inflation).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Investors from Japan, the U.S., Korea, European countries and Taiwan pared down or 
completely stopped their investments. Numerous foreign countries stopped their 
technologic cooperation with China, and suspended their loans, and foreign countries 
suggested to their citizens that they cease investment contracts with China.^*
Eventually, China started re adjusting its direction. It hosted conferences in the 
SEZs and east coast cities to explain in detail the Tiananmen incident. It declared again 
its adherence to the open-door policy and privileges for foreign investors. In order to 
attract more investors, China lengthened its land-use rights to 70 years in several of its 
larger cities (e.g. Xiamen, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Hainan). It also created Taiwanese 
Investment Zones (TIZs) in Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, and other provinces.^^
Although trading and investment activities obviously declined after the Tiananmen 
incident, the total trade across the straits still grew by 28 percent in 1989, reaching 
US$3.5 billion.’* New investment in that year amounted to US$440 million.
By order of the Taiwanese government, direct investment in China is still illegal 
for Taiwanese investors. Hence, Taiwanese investment must still be done indirectly 
through companies in a third country. In 1990, the indirect trade between the two sides 
reached US$4 billion and approved Taiwan enterprises there numbered 1,117.’’ This 
is a 105 percent increase over 1989. Total investment reached US$984 million, 225 
percent as much as that in 1989.
Of all the SEZs and east coast cities, Fujian Province is the major investment 
target, receiving almost three-fourths of the total investments from the Taiwanese.^ 
During this time, the goods Taiwan indirectly exported to China were chiefly industrial
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
12
materials and parts and components, followed by electronical parts and components, 
plastic raw materials and machinery and equipment. Herbal medicines remained Taiwan’s 
leading indirect import from China, followed by food products, tobacco, and fuel.^*
In recent years, the structure of Taiwanese investment in China’s SEZs and coast 
cities has changed. First, it has been shifting from labor-intensive industry to high-tech­
intensive industry and capital-intensive industry. Second, investment activities are now 
extending in such a way that the cooperative fields of the two sides are expanding to 
include industrial investment as well as agricultural cooperation. Third, investors are 
prolonging their involvement from short-term to long-term investment (i.e. contracts 
extending from 15 years to 30 years). Fourth, investment diversity is increasing, 
expanding from investment in a single industry to widespread investment in related 
industries. Finally, the number of wholly foreign-owned enterprises is increasing.^
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER in.
TH E INVESTM ENT ENVIRONM ENT O F CHINA’S SPECIAL ECO N O M IC
ZONES AND M AJOR COASTAL CITIES
AND
CURRENT INVESTING ACTIVITIES
In order to attract foreign investment to achieve its modernization strategy, China 
established, four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in August, 1980; Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and 
Shantou, which are all in Guangdong Province; and Xiamen, in Fujian Province. In 1988, 
a fifth SEZ was established on Hainan Island. In 1984, it opened fourteen coastal cities 
(Dalian, Shanghai, Tianjin, Nantong, Qianghuangdao, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, 
Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, and Beihai) which were more 
economically developed, had obtained higher technology and had more convenient 
transportation than other areas in China. China also granted foreign investors special 
privileges in the open cities and SEZs.^
In 1985, three deltas along the east coast were opened to investment: the Yangtze 
Delta near Shanghai, the Zhujiang Delta near Guangdong, and the Zhanjiang Delta near 
Xiamen. Also opened were Shandong and Liaodong peninsulas.^
Together, all those cities and areas contain approximately 49 percent of the total 
labor involved in light industries, 51 percent of the fixed assets and 55 percent of the total 
production value in China.“  As such, they have become the lifelines of the internal and 
external markets of China.
13
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The central government in Beijing has given local governments the authority to 
approve foreign investment, within certain limits. Shanghai can approve projects of up 
to renminbi (Rmb) 200 million (US$38 million). (US$1 is equal to Rmb 5.32.)“  Beijing 
and Tianjin cities can decide on projects of up to Rmb 150 million (US$28 million). The 
coastal provinces, such as Guangdong, Fujian, Liaoning, and other cities such as Dalian, 
Guangzhou, and Shenyang can rule on projects valued at up to Rmb 50 million (US$10 
million). Other provinces, autonomous regions and coastal cities can usually make 
decisions on projects up to Rmb 25 million (US$4.7 million). The SEZs have been given 
authority to approve heavy industrial projects under Rmb 50 million (US$10 million) and 
light industrial projects under Rmb 30 million (US$5.6 million).^
The SEZs: Shenzhen, Shantou, and Xiamen
Because Hainan is only in the early stages of development and there is minimal 
investing activity there and in Zhuhai, these two SEZs will not be included in the analysis 
in this paper.
Initially, significant obstacles to investment remained. The political situation and 
legal standards of SEZs were unstable, the quality o f the workforce was not as good as 
had been expected, the freedom to hire and fire labor was limited, and market 
opportunities were limited. China’s infrastructure (transportation, energy, communication, 
water supplies and other basic economic necessities) and the legal system were still 
largely undeveloped at the time, and investors were waiting to analyze developments these 
areas. Nevertheless, in 1988, Taiwanese investors moved into China’s coastal areas and 
the SEZs grew.“  Although Hong Kong still has the largest number of projects and most
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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money invested in China, Taiwan is the country that boasts the most rapidly increasing 
rate of investment.^
In the past three years, foreign investment and production output have increased 
in the SEZs and other open areas. The SEZs have served as gateways of economic 
exchange and cooperation between China and foreign countries. Infrastructure 
development in the SEZs has been rapid, providing the necessary environment to attract 
investors, which has helped China prosper. At the same time, economic strategies have 
taken shape, involving the absorption of foreign funds and an emphasis on industrial 
exports.^
The following is a description and analysis of each of the SEZs and the opened 
coastal cities which have received the bulk o f Taiwanese investments or have more 
potential for Taiwanese investors.
Shenzhen SEZ
In 1980, Shenzhen was still a sleepy village with an area of no more than 3 square 
kilometers and an industrial base of 20 small factories. Today, the city has expanded to 
occupy at least 61 square kilometers of land. Shenzhen was the pioneer area for rapid 
development in China during the decade from 1980-1990.^* One of the major factors 
contributing to its rapid development is its geographic location. It is close to Hong Kong 
and the living style, language, and customs are similar in both places. As a result, much 
Hong Kong capital was attracted to this area. Shenzhen is also the largest import and 
export city in the south of China, with a total trade volume that was the third highest 
among China’s coastal cities, behind Shanghai and Tianjin.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Before 1979, 80 percent of the population of Shenzhen was engaged in agriculture. 
By 1988, it was only 30 percent. Nevertheless, the value of agricultural production has 
increased by 150 percent from 1980 to 1990. The agricultural production structure has 
also changed from focusing on grains to aquatic products, fruit, vegetables, pigs and 
chickens.^
Industrial output has seen similar growth. Since 1985, the average annual increase 
in industrial output has been 40-50 percent in Shenzhen, while the average annual growth 
of the entire country of China has been only 17.5 percent. The main industries in 
Shenzhen include electronics, textiles, apparel, food processing, drinks, precision 
instruments, machinery, chemicals, building materials and petrochemicals.^’
Shenzhen was established earlier than other SEZs, so its infrastructure (railroad, 
highway, airport, harbor, telecommunication, energy, land, and water supply systems), 
labor resources, legal system and investment environments are all superior to those in 
other places. Investment in Shenzhen has been encouraged by preferential tax treatment 
and other incentives especially developed by the central government for joint-ventures. 
Wide managerial latitude is allowed, including decisions regarding labor. Shenzhen offers 
bonuses to motivate workers and endorses the labor-contract system under which workers 
are paid in accordance with the job they are doing, not simply by their rank. Shenzhen’s 
enterprises are less subject to detailed state plans, have less bureaucratic supervising, and 
have more opportunities for direct access to funding.
Simplification of the economic bureaucracy has been undertaken. In order to 
avoid systematic complications, Shenzhen reduced the bureaucracy between enterprises
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and the top local government agency. There is now only one layer of bureaucracy instead 
of two.
Freedom in land use reforms has been initiated. In addition to outright foreign 
ownership of land, the government allows foreign investors to build their own plants or 
factories on land leased, rented, or otherwise provided by the state.^ Investors have the 
freedom to sell and mortgage their land-using right to banks or others. F r o m
January to November, 1990, there were 662 new foreign investment projects that received 
approval. The total investment amount in 1990 increased by 30 percent compared with 
the same period of 1989 and reached US$630 million.’®
The mayor of Shenzhen predicts that by the end of this century, it will be securely 
established as an industrially oriented SEZ. It will have a diversified economy, 
generating trade in areas such as science and technology, finance, tourism, agriculture, 
animal husbandry and fishing. Although Shenzhen has been the most dynamic and 
successful SEZ, in the opinion of the Taiwanese, it is not as atttactive as the Xiamen 
SEZ.’® Nevertheless, as much as 16.16 percent of the Taiwanese investment funds that 
China obtained actually flowed into Shenzhen SEZ. By April 1991, 537 Taiwanese 
investors had come to invest in Shenzhen and 90 percent of those gained profits.’^
Taiwanese investors in Shenzhen typically have three characteristics in common. 
First, over 70 percent of Taiwanese investments are wholly-owned enterprises. Second, 
they are focused on small and medium-sized businesses such as electronics, machinery, 
textiles, plastics, hardware, toys, shoes, umbrellas and furniture. Third, by way of turn­
key operation, almost all of the Taiwanese investors shifted their skills, management
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talent, advanced equipment and sometimes entire factories/plants to Shenzhen. 
Shenzhen’s products made by enterprises with Taiwanese investment capital are higher 
in quality and offer greater variety of styles than PRC’s products.
Ironically, if the Taiwanese and other foreign investors remain in Shenzhen, they 
may experience some problems that may obstruct their industrial development Although 
Shenzhen’s investment environment is better than other areas in China, this environment 
is still not highly developed and modernized. It lacks specialists, capital and high-tech 
and managerial skills. Nearly 50 percent of the jobs are part-time and a large number of 
workers are actually from other provinces. Labor resources are not easy to control. 
Labor costs have doubled since 1987, although they are still one-third the price of labor 
in Hong Kong.
Other segments of the economy besides manufacturing are available to Taiwanese 
investors. Houses and land leasing rights can be owned and sold by private persons in 
Shenzhen. Shenzhen has a land area twice that of Hong Kong, and construction costs 
are lower. Real estate (houses, factories and land) is a new opportunity for investors. 
Foreign ownership in these areas was approved in early 1991. By 1991, housing and land 
prices had gone up three to four times compared to the previous three years.
As China is planning to develop its oil refining sector, petrochemical and 
petrochemical downstream industries have gained potential for Taiwanese investors. 
Taiwan has the capability to export advanced equipment and technology in these areas.
With plenty of tourist areas near Hong Kong, tourism, hotel and restaurant
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
19
businesses are all good industries for investors. Taiwanese enterprises can use their 
management methods and managerial skills to offer better services and improve the poor 
management in state-owned hotels and restaurants.
Generally speaking, foreign bank systems are more flexible regarding foreign 
currency transmittance and can offer more attractive customer services than PRC-owned 
banks. Since the system of Chinese banks is limited and more restricted, foreign banks 
are more popular in Shenzhen.’* Although some of them have the capital and expertise, 
Taiwanese investors are limited by ROC government’s restrictions in their activity in 
Taiwan’s banking sector. With the more open regulations available in Shenzhen, the 
banking business is potentially lucrative for Taiwanese investors.
The furniture industry is another new business in Shenzhen. The living standard 
in Shenzhen is rising and creating demand for furniture in local markets. Furniture 
requests in the international market are also increasing. There is a convenient supply of 
wood materials both from inner provinces and imported from abroad. Thanks to the 
reputation of the quality and innovative design of their products, Taiwanese furniture 
enterprises can bring their advanced skills to develop the Shenzhen furniture industry. 
Shantou SEZ
Before 1949, Shantou was a trading center in Guangdong province, like 
Guangzhou. Ten years ago, what is now Shantou SEZ was an area of rolling dunes and 
low-lying land over-grown with weeds. In 1981, Shantou had an area of only 1.6 square 
kilometers within Longhu area. After 1984, it was expanded to include the whole 22.6 
square kilometers of Longhu and 30 square kilometers of the Guangao area.
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As Shantou is located in the subtropical zone, its climate and land conditions are 
suitable for the cultivation of large quantities o f vegetables, fruits, flowers, fishery and 
aquatic products. In 1980s-1990s, Shantou has become well-known for its high-quality 
agriculture products and has many highly-trained agricultural technologists. It has also 
become an experimental agriculture station for the surrounding areas. In its new 
agricultural area, Shantou has built up special ponds to raise shrimp and eels. Production 
lines include fruit canning, instant-freezing of lobsters and vegetable processing (e.g. 
broccoli and asparagus). Other processing operations involve fresh-preservation of fruit, 
meat, bread and snack foods and refining of oyster sauce. By using imported fine breeds 
and advanced technology, Shantou has set up various orchards and pig, duck, fish and 
pigeon farms to enlarge its agricultural exports and speed up the modernization of its 
agriculture.^®
Taiwan was once the largest producer of shrimp and other marine products in the 
world. Novice farmers rushed into the industry and ran into problems. Poor cultivation 
practices, overpopulation of shrimp or fish in ponds where diseases easily spread, and the 
difficulty in acquiring land in Taiwan caused production costs to rise rapidly. A number 
of Taiwanese aquacultural investors went overseas to find profitable development sites.
Shantou has geographic advantages, highly knowledgeable agricultural specialists 
and cheaper production costs Oabor, land and ponds). Since 1987, together with other 
developed zones, Shantou has made China the largest shrimp producer in the world (see 
Table 6). Thus, one of the most attractive fields for Taiwan is aquaculture, where 
Taiwanese producers can exchange their knowledge and experience with the local
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specialists. In the late 1980’s, Taiwanese investors started to invest in Shantou. By 
March 1989, there were 13 Taiwanese-owned enterprises there.
Table 6
ASIA’S SHRIM P FARMERS
(Output of cultured crustaceans, in ’(XX) tones)
COUNTRY ’80 181 ’82 ’83 IM ’85 ’86 ’87 ’88
Bangladesh 2.7 3.0 3.4 3.8 8.2 11.3 19.5 22.1 25.0
China 0.1 2.0 5.0 9.6 22.0 42.7 85.4 156.0 200.0
India 11.2 11.2 11.2 14.9 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 30.0
Indonesia 24.0 28.6 ;31.1 28.0 32.4 38.9 41.1 42.6 50.0
Japan 1.6 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.5 2.5
South Korea 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5
Malaysia n.a. n.a. 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4 3.0
Philippines 1.4 1.7 1.8 13.0 29.7 30.3 32.5 36.9 40.0
Singapore n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5
Taiwan 3.9 6.1 9.6 11.0 13.4 65.0 75.0 90.0 20.0
Thailand 8.2 10.9 10.4 12.7 16.2 18.5 19.1 22.6 40.0
Vietnam 4.0 4.0 7.0 7.0 13.0 18.0 23.8 28.6 30.0
Source: R.O.C., Food and Agriculture Organization
There are other good fields in which to invest in Longhu. They include textiles, 
electronics, fine chemicals, aquatic products, fruit and vegetable and flower planting, 
recreation centers, banking services and warehousing. In Guangao, the better industries 
to invest in are tourism, petrochemistry, light textiles, fisheries, aquatic products, 
transportation and banking services.'*®
Shantou is the second most attractive SEZ to Taiwanese investors, next to 
Xiamen.'** In order to attract more Taiwanese investors, Shantou established some 
special regulations for them.'*  ̂ Taiwanese investors need not pay user-fees for
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plants/factories, land and houses for the first five years. Machines, plants, factories and 
houses can use rapid cumulative depreciation. Taiwanese industries can be managed by 
their relatives in China. If a Taiwanese investment exceeds US$1 million, two of the 
investor’s relatives in China are allowed change their status from rural residents to urban 
citizens. This means they can obtain the benefits of urban citizens, such as not being 
required to work as farmers, they can be assigned to a better job, and they can move and 
live in urban areas. If a Taiwanese owns over 25 percent of the stock share in Shantou’s 
joint venture and technical co-operation industries, two of their relatives may also enjoy 
the same privileges as described above. Similar to other SEZs, Taiwanese investors can 
also invest in land development in Shantou.
Xiamen SEZ
Xiamen is an urban SEZ located right on the shore of Fujian Province, just across 
the Taiwan Strait from Taiwan. Xiamen SEZ was established in 1980, including 2.2 
square kilometers of Huli Industrial Zone. By 1984, the local government had expanded 
the land area of Xiamen SEZ to encompass the entirety of Xiamen island, which is 130 
square kilometers.
Since 1984, Xiamen has tried to improve its infrastructure through US$540 million 
of government investment, including transportation, public utilities and connununication 
systems. This amount was 54 times the total state investment that Xiamen received 
during the period from 1949 through 1979.^^ These efforts have resulted in an expanded 
and reliable infrastructure. During the whole year of 1987, there was not a single 
interruption of electrical power supply to Huli. Railroad and highway systems have been
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expanded and upgraded to handle the doubled volume of traffic since 1980.^
Unlike other SEZs, which were built on bare marsh and farm land, Xiamen had 
an established industrial base. Xiamen had a large number of factories, a commercial port 
and, compared with much of the rest of China, a better-educated workforce (The Xiamen 
University is located here).
Among all foreign investments, only 18 projects came from Taiwan. During this 
time, the development goal of Xiamen was focused on export processing industries and 
tourism. Overseas Chinese investors were the ftrst group of tourists that Xiamen wanted 
to attract.'*^ Since 1989, the total amount of foreign investment absorbed by Xiamen 
(US$18,285 million) has surpassed Shenzhen and ranked Xiamen first among the coastal 
areas of China.^
In 1988, many of the limitations on travel between Taiwan and (Zhina were 
relaxed, and the Taiwanese government began to allow its citizens to visit their relatives 
in China. Taiwanese investors started to operate in Xiamen through trade and investment. 
Almost one-third of the Taiwanese capital invested in China flowed into this area. From 
then on, development and investment in Xiamen started to boom. By the end of 1988, 
113 Taiwanese investors, almost all of whom had invested in labor-intensive industries, 
had moved into this zone."*̂
By the end of November 1989, there were 225 Taiwanese investors who invested 
their money in Xiamen. Although they were relative latecom ^s, Taiwanese entrepreneurs 
outstripped in 1989, in total investment, the veteran investors from Hong Kong, overseas 
Chinese and other foreign investors. O f total foreign investment in Xiamen in 1989,
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almost 70 percent came from Taiwan. Since then, the foreign investment amount in 
Xiamen has surpassed that in Shenzhen, giving Xiamen the highest Taiwanese investment 
among all SEZs. Almost 50 percent of the total Taiwanese investment in China flowed 
into Fujian Province, with Xiamen sharing 33 percent of this figure.'**
The cost of labor in Xiamen was the lowest among the SEZs before 1988. 
Although it had almost doubled by 1991, it was still very low, compared with that outside 
China. Turnover for the highest paid workers and total overhead costs were both low,*’ 
Taiwanese investments in Xiamen are largely in manufacturing and production; wholly- 
owned enterprises were geared towards production for export. The investments have 
focused on small and medium-sized businesses. Almost 40 percent o f Taiwanese 
investments have accomplished the cycle of investment, production, and remuneration 
within only one year. Most of these investments have been channeled into light and 
labor-intensive industries such as production of shoes, eyeglasses, plastics, and electronics 
and chemical engineering projects.^ These businesses imported from abroad 80 percent 
of the raw materials used in production. Over 80 percent o f its production was exported 
to Taiwan’s international market. Xiamen’s ultimate success will depend on its ability 
to develop as a source of both investment and production materials to the Taiwanese. 
This is not unrealistic, as in the past three years, over 90 percent o f Taiwanese investors 
gained profits in Xiamen.
Taiwanese initially invested in Xiamen on a trial basis. Their investments were 
always placed in low-cost, labor-intensive industry. Today, Taiwanese investors have 
changed their attitude and turned to long-term, stable investment, group investment and
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entire-area development. In response, the local government established a new Taiwanese 
Investment Zone (TIZ) and granted special privileges for Taiwanese investors in order to 
encourage them. This TIZ includes the old Xiamen SEZ and is expanded to cover the 
Xingling and Haichang areas.
The sudden boom in Xiamen’s economy has resulted in some problems:
Lack of infrastructure. An increase in number of plants/factories has caused a 
power shortage problem. The increase in business also brought about an increase 
of vehicles involved in transportation, thus giving rise to frequent traffic jams in 
Xiamen.
Shortage of business space. Hotel and office accommodations have become 
inadequate as more businessmen come to this area. The ever-increasing 
investment from Taiwan led to a shortage of supply of plants/factories. Some 
Taiwanese investors had no recourse but to rent schools or military camps as their 
provisional plants/factories.
Speculative activities. As Taiwanese investment increased in Xiamen, the prices 
of land-use rights and houses spiraled. Many Taiwanese went into the real estate 
business.
Low skill level in the workforce. The economic boom in Xiamen led to a great 
demand for high-tech specialists and high-level managers. Despite their relatively 
good education, the average skill level of workers and managers was still quite 
low. The cost of training the Chinese and providing expatriate management for 
foreign joint ventures was correspondingly high.
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As Taiwan and Xiamen share one dialect (Minnanhua), food culture and common 
heritage (over half of Taiwanese’s ancestors were from Fujian), there is some kinship and 
special feeling between them. Hence, tourism is a good field to develop. In addition, 
real estate prices in Xiamen had nearly doubled from 1988 to 1990. Real estate trading 
business is another potentially profitable field for Taiwanese investors.
Taiwan’s plastics and petrochemical tycoon, Yung-ching Wang, has announced 
that his company, Formosa Plastics, will invest in a naphtha-cracking plant in Xiamen in 
the mid-1990’s. A large number of related mid- and downstream petrochemical 
processors which are suffering from a shortage of raw materials will follow Wang to 
China to join the 700 Taiwan petrochemical processors who are already there.®  ̂ This 
will be another boost for Xiamen’s economy. Petrochemicals and their mid- and 
downstream petrochemical processing industries are all potential profit-yielding fields for 
Taiwanese investors in Xiamen.
In view of Taiwan’s new technology and skills in breeding, raising, and packing 
aquatic products, the Xiamen government has developed another investment area — 
Dongshan Island, a county of Xiamen, for Taiwanese aquaculture investment. By March 
1991, there were 16 Taiwanese businesses invested in aquatic products raising and 
processing. The total investment was US$9.3 million.®^
C hina’s Coastal Cities.
In 1984, Beijing opened its fourteen coastal cities to complement its SEZ 
development plans. According to their characteristics, these fourteen cities can be divided 
into four ca teg o rie ssy n th e tic  open, trading, base and harbor transporting.
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As of 1991, synthetic open style includes Shanghai, Tiangjin, and Guangzhou. 
The requirements to be in this category include having been an economic center, having 
obtained higher technology and management skills, having more developed international 
trade, and possessing convenient transportation and developed industries.
In 1991, the trading category included three cities: Dalian, Qingdao, and Ningbo. 
The special features of these cities are that they have attracted more foreign investors than 
other cities and they might develop to be the potential middlemen between China and 
outside countries.
Base category in 1991 included Fuzhou, Wenzhou, Nantong, Yantai, Zhanjiang, 
and Beihai. These cities have easy access to raw materials and natural resources.
Harbor transporting category had only two cities to date: Qianghuangdao, and 
Lianyungang.
Only Shanghai and Dalian will be discussed in this report.
Shanghai
Shanghai, the so-called oriental Paris, is the largest city and sea port in China. It 
is a gate to the Yangtze River areas, and it serves as a window to the outside world. 
Since the beginning of economic reform, it has also become an economic, commercial 
(i.e., import and export products gathering spot), information, industrial, and financial 
center in China. The old city of Shanghai, including Hongqiao, Minghang, and 
Zhaohejing industrial areas, is on the western side of the Huangpu River.
In order to accelerate development in Shanghai, the government offered Taiwanese 
and other foreign investors some special benefits that differ little from those already
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
28
enjoyed by the SEZs (i.e., sizeable tax concessions, the grant of land leases, and banking 
services’ setting). Other enticements include a 15 percent low profit tax rate for joint 
ventures and other foreign enterprises. If enterprises are committed for 10 years or more, 
they are duty-free for the first two profitable years. In the third profitable year, they are 
granted a 50 percent reduction in tax. They can import duty-free raw materials and 
equipment. There is a five-year tax holiday for foreign businesses involved in building 
infrastructural facilities (airports, ports, railroads, subways, and power systems), followed 
by a 50 percent reduction in tax for the next five years.
Foreign banks and other financial services are allowed to operate on a trial basis. 
Only foreign currency transactions are permitted. Foreign banks are not allowed to 
handle renminbi business. Red tape has been reduced to a minimum (the approval 
process for foreign operations has been shortened from originally having to obtain 133 
separate chops (approvals) to 20), with traders exempt from having to obtain visas.
The Pudong sector of Shanghai has the right to retain its revenues for further 
development. It also established a free-trade zone (FTZ). Imports moving into this FTZ 
are tax-free if they are intended for re-export. Wide consultation with scientists and 
people from all sectors has resulted in full use of the city’s geographical, industrial, and 
scientific advantages to develop economic links with other countries.^ Foreign investors 
may own shares in the local stock market They also have the right to lease large tracts 
o f land for 50-70 years for development. As the statistics show, foreign joint ventures 
have done better in Shanghai than elsewhere in China. Almost 98 percent have gained 
profits from investments in Shanghai, while'the failure rate of investment in other places
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is 60 percent/^ However, some chronic problems (e.g. shortage of cash and raw 
materials, and poor transportation) still present obstacles to development.
Shanghai, Ningbo, Hainan, and other opened cities share almost 60 percent of all 
the Taiwanese investment in China.^ To Taiwanese investors, Shanghai is not as 
attractive as other opened areas in Fujian and Guangdong Provinces.^^ Shanghai has not 
enough infrastructure to meet the rapidly increasing demand. In 1987, the price of raw 
materials skyrocketed and production costs rose. After the Tiananmen incident, the 
central government even restricted shipping and selling of raw materials within China. 
This brought about a raw materials shortage for the industries in Shanghai. The only way 
to solve the problem was to import more expensive raw materials from abroad by using 
scarce, costly foreign currency.
Although Shanghai has a special tax incentive for investors to invest in local 
infrastructure, foreign investors will probably be reluctant to make major investment in 
this infrastructure. It takes too long for this kind of investment to recover the capital and 
to yield a profit.
In 1989, the city’s profit tax on industrial enterprises was 33 percent of earnings, 
compared to a national average tax o f 19 percent (and just 17 percent in Guangdong 
Province). Each year Shanghai contributes 60-70 percent of its income to the state. In 
1989, it was allowed to keep 33 percent of the revenue, up from 25 percent previously. 
Shanghai’s annual contribution to the state is computed to be as much as one-sixth of the 
country’s total revenue. The real revenue from investment that investors might keep in 
Shanghai is not as profitable as in other opened areas.®*
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In 1990, Taiwanese investment in Shanghai was computed at over US$100 
million, and the total investment amount had surpassed US$300 million. It is evident that 
Taiwanese investors are most interested in Pudong. In March 1990, the local government 
set up Taiwan Business and Industries Zones for the more than 7500 Taiwanese investors 
in Shanghai. The Taiwanese focused their investments primarily on textiles, food 
processing, and tourism. They also invested in hotels, recreation centers, department 
stores and golf course development.
Dalian
In 1984, when China was still in the initial stage of opening its door to trade, 
Dalian was only a wasteland of 3 square kilometers dotted with fishing villages. It is 
located in the southern part of Liaodong Peninsula in Liaoning Province. Today it 
functions as a key link in import and export of the three northeastern provinces and Inner 
Mongolia. An international, commercial and industrial harbor, it has regular shipping 
business with over sixty countries. It has a modem industrial base, and is home to a 
number of foreign joint ventures.^
To create the best possible atmosphere for cooperation with potential partners from 
overseas, Dalian concentrated its efforts on setting up modem infrastructure facilities. 
Since 1985, the local govemment has invested Rmb 430 million (US$80.83 million) in 
its basic infrastructure. Its overall aim was to develop advanced and export-oriented 
technology industries, with a special emphasis on high-tech projects and capital-intensive 
industries that have an objective to export 60 percent of their output. By 1990, it had 
expanded to a new 20 square kilometers’ Economic and Technological Developed Zone.
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The major industries in Dalian are electronics, machinery, chemical products, textiles, 
food processing, light manufacturing, and ship building.
From January to June, 1990, the total export value from Dalian was US$2.68 
billion, a 23.3 percent increase from 1989.“  The average annual volume of foreign 
shipments handled in Dalian Harbor was 50 million tons, comprising 68 percent of the 
total foreign shipments in China.
Entrepreneurs who started their businesses in Dalian before the end of 1990 were 
offered a 10-30 percent discount on land rents. In order to attract high-tech knowledge, 
the municipal govemment set up several areas for foreign investors to use. The investors 
are free to transfer or sell their use and lease rights. The land use and rental periods are 
for 50 years.
Dalian has an excellent geographic location for both land and water transport. 
Investors might come not only for the immediate economic benefits, but with an eye to 
its future development.®* Given these incentives, shipping enterprises and firms that 
handle the harbor loading and unloading services and transit marine cargos might be good 
investments in Dalian.
The scenery is attractive and the climate is pleasant in Dalian. The northeastern 
provinces are the original home of the Ching Dynasty. The historic sites attract 
Taiwanese tourists. Tourism might be a profitable field to invest in. T h e  t h r e e  
northeastern provinces, together with Inner Mongolia, make up a vast area with rich 
manpower, ample natural resources, strong industrial bases and a considerable technical 
force. In cooperation with the U.S., China has set up a Dalian industrial and technical
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management training center. It is close to the iron, steel, coal operations (Anshun and 
Shenyang) and aluminium (Fushun) mines. These natural resources are all very important 
in Taiwan’s heavy industry development. As Dalian has convenient access to ample 
resources that Taiwan is short of, it is better for Taiwanese investors to use local minerals 
to develop heavy industries in Dalian than to invest in other coastal cities.
Taiwanese investors can invest in the emerging mill or steel refinery areas, or in 
raw materials export. By way of turn key operations, Taiwanese industries in Dalian can 
reduce costs and control the quality of their products. In the last two years, Taiwanese 
investors in Dalian have focused on value added industries like building materials, food 
processing, metallurgy, chemicals, electronics, and machinery.
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CHAPTER IV.
OBSTACLES EXPERIENCED BY TAIW ANESE INVESTORS
Basic In frastructu re  System:
A shortage of infrastructure is a chronic problem in China. Some opened coastal 
cities, such as Nantong, Wenzhou, and Beihai rely on highways as the major form of 
transportation. Some areas have just one railroad.^ Lack of transportation systems 
(railroads, highways, harbors and airports) causes a raw materials shortage for the 
industries in the opened coastal areas. Transporting raw materials from inner China to 
the coastal areas is difficult, and the cost is higher than importing from outside countries.
China has promised Taiwanese enterprises adequate energy supplies, but there is 
still a 15 percent to 20 percent energy shortage, and energy interruptions of two to three 
days a week are not uncommon. Production, delivery, and distribution schedule delays 
due to inefficient energy supply and transportation are very common in China.”
Out-of-date telecommunication systems cause delays in receiving information from 
and about the outside world. This causes investors to lose opportunities and to make 
incorrect business decisions. This will indirectly influence the reputation (high efficiency 
and good quality) and profits of Taiwanese enterprises in China. This, in turn, causes 
Taiwanese industries to only accept long-term or regular orders for their products, giving 
up the short-term or rushed orders.
Since the Tiananmen incident, the World Bank has adopted a tighter policy for 
loans to China. The tighter credit from outside of China, combined with the shortage of
33
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funds from within China, has caused serious shortages of capital for infrastructure. These 
problems have caused Taiwanese investors to avoid investment in inner China and to 
focus on Guangdong and Fujian Provinces. Total Taiwanese investment in these areas 
represented one-tenth of the total amount of foreign investment as of 1989.^
Raw  M aterials Supply:
China’s inefficient transportation system makes it difficult to transport building 
and industrial materials. It is illegal to trade raw materials between provinces due to the 
1988 austerity policy. This problem has caused some raw materials producers or 
producing provinces to arbitrarily raise the price of raw materials. The quantity and 
quality of raw materials are hard for management to control. This causes delays in 
production and delays delivery dates. Although China faces a foreign currency shortage, 
investors must still spend their foreign currency to import more expensive raw materials 
from other countries. The short supply of raw materials increases the investment risk 
for Taiwanese investors, and causes economic inflation in China.
Governm ent Adm inistration:
In order to increase the development in opened coastal areas, China granted more 
privileges and authority to local governments. This has led to some enterprises having 
to pay unreasonable taxes or fees, under threat of losing approval of the local govemment 
officials.
China has simplified the permission and approval process for Taiwanese investors, 
but the bureaucracy and overlapping organizations in the Chinese govemment continue 
to cause the paperwork process to be a time-consuming process filled with delays.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
35
Spending 6 months to 1 year waiting for the approval from over a hundred govemment 
officials is not uncommon when setting up a business in China.^^ This wastes investors’ 
money and time. The officials often try to shirk their responsibility to avoid troubles, 
which increases the paper shuffling by investors even after production has begun.
Chinese like to use "guanxi" (the Chinese word for connections or contacts) when 
they deal in business. There are some implicit agreements or so-called "understandings" 
between businessmen and officials.^ The businessmen give under-the-table money, and 
offer social parties and gifts to the public officials who handle their cases. If the 
Taiwanese investors do not have any close relationships or know any important officials 
in the government, the permission and approval process will be extremely difficult for 
those who are not schooled in this type of business dealing. If they do have "guanxi" in 
the govemment organization, they do not even need the normal application process, and 
are able to get the permission license privately.
If raw materials are imported for processing, but the completed products are only 
exported, the Taiwanese enterprises can apply for an import tax reimbursement on them. 
This is a special preference for Taiwanese enterprises, but the application process is 
complicated and applicants can not apply for the entire import tax reimbursement at one 
time. The order of tax reimbursement does not give Taiwanese investors any preference. 
It only increases their problems because the amount of time that it takes due to the 
bureaucratic red tape may not be worth the amount of money that is received as a tax 
reimbursement.
Legal System:
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Besides central government control, every local govemment can enact its own 
regulations. There are 35 provinces and more than 10 municipalities in China, leading 
to many different types of regulations in the country. Ironically, from a profit standpoint, 
sometimes the regulations which are enacted by the local govemment will conflict with 
those issued by the central govemment. For example: the central government forbids 
Taiwanese investors to invest in hotels, restaurants, and department stores. In order to 
attract Taiwanese investors, a number of opened coastal areas allow investment in these 
fields. There is not a standard rule for investors to follow.
Although there are a number of supposedly preferential treatments for Taiwanese 
investors, the effectiveness of the measures depend on the language of the law. It is not 
clear what the terms are.*  ̂ For example, the Regulation on Encouraging Foreign 
Investment announced that foreign investors can refuse to pay unreasonable fees. 
However, there is no definition of what is an unreasonable fee, and no legal rules stating 
what constitutes violations. In view of this inept legal system, the person who charges 
the unreasonable fees to the investors will never be punished. There is not an arbitration 
system or neutral organization to handle the cases for the Taiwanese investors who have 
suffered from unfair treatment.**
Since China is without legal concepts and business ethics, the contracts signed by 
both China and the investors might be arbitrarily modified. The investors may have 
thought items in the contract they signed were satisfactory and fair. However, the items 
in the contract might be totally different from the original contract. Usually both parties 
sign the last page, enabling one to have the other pages changed. The best way for the
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investors to avoid being cheated by China is for both parties to chop (stamp), sign, or 
impress the thumb on the binding between each page of the contract. To prevent page 
editing, both parties must keep track on the top of each edited column.
Political Situation:
China’s economic policies always follow its political policies. In view of China’s 
internal political problems, with top-level bureaucrats fighting among themselves for 
power, its political policies are not stable. This instability causes erratic economic 
policies, which sometimes tighten and sometimes relax. Between tightening and relaxing, 
it makes it difficult for investors to have principles to follow.
Before the Tiananmen incident, Taiwanese could get multiple-entry visas from 
China. After Tiananmen, China was scared of bad influences (i.e., invasion of democratic 
ideas) from Taiwan and suddenly changed its policy to a single entry visa for Taiwanese.
In 1988 and 1989, China changed its international trading policy three times. It 
focused on export trade, then changed to both domestic and export trade. After the 
Tiananmen incident, it switched to restricted import and controlled export policy further 
confusing potential investors.
O perating Costs:
There are two kinds of operational costs in China. The first is the visible cost. 
This includes labor wages, bonuses, overhead (taxes, raw materials, telecommunication, 
delivery, water, power, rental, managerial, and transportation expenses), as discussed 
above. The other is the invisible cost. This includes several kinds o f fees that the 
investors would not know about before they moved into China. These include social.
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problem solving, investment consultant, research, and training fees. Both costs are a 
heavy burden for Taiwanese investors. The invisible cost cannot be controlled or 
researched before investments flow into China.^
It is difficult for the investors to predict the future profits of enterprises. Since 
1985, the land, housing, and product prices in China have been getting higher, causing 
a serious inflation problem. In the first six months of 1988, the retail price index rose 
by 13 percent, and the cost of living for workers in the major cities grew by 14,4 
percent.^® The living and production operation costs in China in 1991 were two to three 
times higher than in 1988,
Although wages have increased, many people still complain that the rate at which 
incomes rise cannot keep up with the rate of inflation. China now has the highest 
inflation rate in Asia, (see Table 7)
Another problem in China that increases the investors’ operation costs is the 
serious depreciation of its renminbi. For example, in late 1988, one U.S. dollar converted 
to approximately 3.5 Rmb. In May of 1991, Rmb 5.32 converted to one U.S. dollar. The 
renminbi depreciation problem causes Taiwanese enterprises, which import raw materials 
for processing, to spend more renminbi to buy the needed raw materials.
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T able 7
INFLATION RATES IN SELECTED ASIAN COUNTRIES (I981-I990)
Unit: Percent
1981 - 1983 1984 - 1987 1988 1989 1990
Rep. of China 6.9 0.2 1.3 4.5 4.5
(Taiwan)
Hong Kong 11.5 4.9 7.5 10.0 7.5
India 10.9 10.9 9.4 8.5 10.0
Indonesia 11.2 7.6 8.0 6.5 7.5
Malaysia 6.4 1.5 2.5 4.0 4.5
Philippines 11.1 19.6 8.7 10.5 11.0
Singapore 4.5 0.6 1.5 2.5 2.8
South Korea 10.5 2.7 7.1 6.5 7.5
Thailand 7.2 1.9 3.8 6.0 6.5
People’s Rep. 1.9 6.2 18.5 21.0 12.0
of China
Average figure of
Asian Countries 7.2 6.1 10.5 11.6 9.1
Source; Asian Economic Commentary, November 1989.
L abor Quality:
Although China has ample labor resources, there are problems with the quality of 
its labor force. The investors cannot hire or fire workers without permission of local 
govemment. The workers have no fear of bad performance in their jobs. Chatting, 
skipping work, or leaving the office early are common problems in China.
Although the investors pay higher wages to their workers, compared with the 
wages of those who work for Chinese enterprises, the Chinese workers cannot receive all 
their wages from foreign enterprises. The actual payment the workers receive is almost 
the same as if they worked for domestic enterprises. For example, every month the
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enterprise pays Rmb 600 to its workers. The actual amount the worker can receive might 
only be Rmb 150. Without any incentive, the workers will not be very productive.
Bad labor quality can influence the production quality. World Bank statistics show 
that China is one of the lowest working efficiency countries in the world, (see Table 8) 
Combining the wage and working efficiency problems in China, the overall operations 
cost may actually be cheaper in Taiwan.
Table 8
COM PARATIVE LABOR WAGES AND EFFICIENCY
C ountry   Index__
U.S. 100
Japan 75
Singapore 60
Taiwan 33
Hong Kong 32
South Korea 22
China (Representative — Shenzhen) 18
Source: The World Bank 1989 Statistic Survey.
Foreign Currency and  M onetary System:
In view of the shortage of foreign currency, China has severely controlled this 
resource. In order to prevent foreign currency outflow, China requires that foreign 
investors use a convertible foreign currency to reimburse loans to Chinese banks, to pay 
for the cost of imported raw materials, to pay salaries of their foreign workers, and to pay 
for profit distribution to foreign stockholders. These restrictions cause investors to have 
a large supply of foreign currency, but the foreign currency demand exceeds the supply.
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Many investors can only get the foreign currency they need on the black market. This 
has caused the price of foreign currency to skyrocket over its official stated value, which 
then invisibly increases the operation cost for the foreign investors.’^
It is also difficult for investors to repatriate profits out of China. They can only 
reinvest their profits back into China’s market. The investing enterprises vastly prefer to 
use cash when conducting business in China because checking accounts and capital 
movement are difficult using Chinese banks. The amount of funds that Taiwanese 
investors need may be two to three times more than they need to invest in Taiwan.
There are three kinds of currency circulated in China: Renminbi is used only in 
the domestic market; Foreign Exchange Certificates (EEC) can be kept by the foreigner 
and used in hotels, govemment owned department stores, or foreign enterprises; and 
foreign currency can be used in international transactions. They all have their own 
exchange rate in the official market. The official exchange rates for EEC and foreign 
currency are usually two to three times less than the rate in the black market. There are 
too many types of currencies to be controlled by the government, causing confusion for 
the foreign investors.
Some investors run currency speculation businesses. They buy EEC or foreign 
currency first, and then exchange it in the black market to obtain two to three times as 
much renminbi. The people who own EEC or foreign currency can obtain more cash by 
exchanging the currency. This gives the enterprises more funds to run their businesses. 
Although the investors can obtain more by exchanging EEC or foreign currency on the 
black market, it is riskier for them. Using this source of funds, a number of Taiwanese
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investors have been swindled by speculating in the black market.
Banking Problem s:
Chinese National Banks do not accept letters of credit (L/C) from Taiwanese 
banks, and vice versa. This is because any kind of amendment to the credit and banking 
regulations would entail an enormous amount of negotiation between China and Taiwan. 
The only option for both parties is to allow banks from a third country to process L/C 
forms for Taiwan and China. This further complicates the banking process and increases 
the payment time.
In order for Taiwanese enterprises to import raw materials from outside China, 
they need permission from the Chinese govemment. After the investors obtain 
permission, they can request that the Bank of China issue its letters of credit. Due to 
China’s shortage of foreign currency, the approval for import permission and the 
application for L/C can be difficult. These factors cause production schedules and 
shipping delays. The delays hurt the reputation of Taiwanese enterprises in the 
international market.
Since there is a shortage of funds in China, loan service for Taiwanese investors 
is more difficult than other services in Chinese banks. According to Taiwan law, direct 
investment in China is still illegal for Taiwanese investors. It is impossible for Taiwanese 
enterprises who set up businesses in China to obtain support (loans) from Taiwan’s banks. 
The Taiwanese investors must have their own capital or get loans from third country 
banks when considering the financing of their enterprises.
F u tu re  Problems:
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Hong Kong is the bridge for Taiwanese trading and investment in China. In 1997, 
Hong Kong will be returned to China. The political situation in China is not yet stable, 
so it is hard for Taiwanese investors to predict China's future strategy in managing Hong 
Kong. The chronic political problems between Taiwan and China will not be solved in 
a short period of time. Perhaps Taiwanese investors who have a branch office or agent 
in Hong Kong would be better off to try to find another third party country in which to 
locate.
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CH A PTER V.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
After the Tiananmen incident, the American Business Environment Risk 
Information Service surveyed each country’s investing environment and income difference 
among citizens, the political and social environment, and availability of foreign exchange. 
The company rated China as one of the riskiest areas for investment for the next five 
years. The lowest risk areas obtained an index of one (e.g., Taiwan, Japan, Singapore, 
and West Germany), while China received an index of three.^^
The factors influencing Taiwanese investment in China are political stability, labor 
resource, the stability of economic strategy, market potential, and the social 
atmosphere.^^ (see Table 9) Political stability is the most important factor for Taiwanese 
investors to evaluate before investing capital in China.
Table 9
COM PARATIVE INVESTMENT FACTORS INFLUENCING TAIW ANESE 
INVESTM ENT (From a Survey of Taiwanese Investors)
(Unit: percent)
July, 1989 M ay 1988 
Political Stability 91.7 66.8
Labor Problem 58.8 56.8
Stabilities of Economic Strategy 52.5 42.3
Market Potential 44.9 58.1
Social atmosphere 22.6 45.2
Source: Global Views Monthly, July 14, 1989; 162
Due to the unstable political environment, investment in China is riskier than in
44
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other countries. The two Chinese economies would greatly benefit from a normal 
economic relationship. China offers Taiwan a familiar investment environment with the 
same language, customs, and living styles. It also offers a potentially huge market with 
ample labor resources, a large supply of untapped natural resources, and a relatively solid 
heavy industry and technological base. It lacks capital and management knowledge. In 
contrast, Taiwan, with the highest foreign exchange reserves in the world, has a 
resourceful workforce, advanced marketing and management skills, and a very 
competitive consumer industry. As the two economies evolve to naturally complement 
each other, conditions will become more and more favorable for Taiwanese investment 
in China. Although past records indicate that the success rate of Taiwanese investment 
in China was only 50 percent, Taiwanese investors are still the fastest-growing group 
among all foreign investors in China. '̂*
After tlie Tiananmen incident, economic policy has become more conservative in 
China, but its onen door policy has never changed. Since 1990, the political situation has 
become more stable, and foreign investment has started to return. In the first four months 
of 1991, there were more than 3,100 foreign projects approved, an increase of 90 percent 
over the previous year.^* The total value of investment contracts hit US$3.26 billion, 
which was 164 percent higher than 1990. Actual foreign investment value reached 
US$857 million, a 16 percent increase. The wholly foreign-owned enterprises increased 
106 percent Tliese figures show that the confidence of foreign investors in China is 
recovering.^*
Taiwanese investors have shown confidence in China similar to that of other
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foreign investors. Past investment emphasized short-term investments in labor-intensive 
industries, in small areas, or on a single industry, and in cooperation with China. Today 
the trend is toward long-term investments in high-tech-intensive and capital-intensive 
industries, whole-area development, and vertical integration of related industries.
Taiwanese investors have broadened from concentrating enterprises in Guangdong 
and Fujian Provinces to all areas rich in natural resources. They have also changed the 
means of investment from indirect through a third country to over 50 percent direct 
investment in China, even though official Taiwanese government policy is that direct 
investment remains illegal. The ROC government overlooks these transactions.
There are different regulations and privileges in the SEZs and opened coastal 
cities. In each place, there are different natural resources, raw materials, environments, 
and/or customs. These were discussed in chapter in. From the author’s viewpoint, 
although China is a risky place to invest, it is still has great potential as an investment 
site for Taiwanese investors. In view of political reunification and mutual economic 
supplementary issues, Taiwanese are treated better than other foreigners in China. China 
has ma(k efforts to improve the investing environment. It not only improved its 
infrastructure, but also announced and amended several regulations for Taiwanese 
investors. The influence of China’s internal political instability will not have as drastic 
effect on Taiwanese investors as on those from other countries.
Investors should monitor the changes o f the political and economic strategies 
before investing in China. Investors should not only research the area and businesses to 
invest in, but also study the obstacles that were discussed in chapter IV. Taiwanese
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investors should diversify their investments in order to prevent China from controlling 
Taiwan’s economy. The unstable political situation, the changing economic policies, and 
unhealthy legal system are still problems inside of China. Given these concerns, 
Taiwanese investors should not depend on China too much. An appropriate balance 
between short- and long-term investments should be sought, with caution (but not 
timidity) governing investment activities.
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